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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

implication because a dry ditch could not reasonably be encompassed
within the term "waters of the state." Therefore, the court held the
improper instruction constituted harmless error and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Holly Shook

VIRGINIA
Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 581 S.E.2d 510 (Va. 2003) (holding
failure of pleadings to put ownership of pond's waters in issue
precluded circuit court from considering the issue as within general
prayer for relief).
This case involved a dispute regarding ownership of Gaskins Pond,
including the bed and water within the pond. Bay House Associates
("Bay House") owned the pond bed in fee simple. Formerly, a small
strip of land separated the pond from Chesapeake Bay. In recent
years, a small opening within the pond bottom created an outlet
allowing the waters to flow freely between Gaskin Pond and
Chesapeake Bay. As the opening of the pond grew bigger, many of the
neighboring landowners constructed piers grounded in, and
extending into, the once isolated pond.
Claiming these piers
trespassed onto its land, Bay House sent letters to its neighbors
requesting immediate removal of the piers. The neighbors did not
comply; thus, Bay House sued seeking injunctive relief in the Circuit
Court of Northumberland County.
Although Bay House only sought injunctive relief to force removal
of the base of the piers from the pond bed, the circuit court granted
unrequested relief by finding Bay House to own in fee simple the pond
bed and the waters of the pond. The issue on appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court was whether the circuit court had authority to grant
unrequested relief. The court held a litigant's pleadings are essential
as his or her proof, and a court may not award particular relief unless
it is substantially in accord with the case asserted in the pleadings.
Furthermore, every litigant is entitled to be told by her adversary in
plain and explicit language the grounds of complaint or defense,
especially when the respondent has the burden of proof involved in an
affirmative defense, such as the case here. Here, the court noted that
Bay House requested both specific and general prayers for relief, and
further asserted that enjoining the neighbors from using the water of
Gaskins Pond was not inconsistent with the specific prayer request
regarding land ownership; therefore, the injunction should be upheld.
However, a general prayer will support relief only for those matters
placed in controversy by the pleadings and, thus, any relief granted
must be supported by allegations of material facts in the pleadings that
will sustain such relief. Therefore, because Bay House's request for

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 7

relief did not put the ownership of Gaskin Pond's waters at issue, the
court held the circuit court erred in granting Bay house fee simple
ownership of the waters within Gaskin Pond.
The court ultimately held Bay House's failure to allege ownership
of the pond water within the pleadings precluded the circuit court
from making a decision on the issue. Viewing the substance of the
litigant's pleading with paramount importance, the court reversed the
circuit court's holding regarding the water ownership.
Aimee Wagstaff

State Water Control Bd. v. Crutchfield, 578 S.E.2d 762 (Va. 2003)
(holding the Virginia Court of Appeals abused its discretion in
denying a request to amend a petition, where the request was timely
and the record lent no support to the denial).
Frances B. Crutchfield and her son, Henry R. Broadus (collectively,
"Crutchfield"), filed an appeal asking the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, to invalidate a permit the State Water Control
Board ("Board") granted to Hanover County. The permit allowed
Hanover County to discharge up to ten million gallons per day of
treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River adjacent to Crutchfield's
In response, the Board filed a demurrer asserting
property.
Crutchfield lacked standing to pursue an appeal.
The circuit court overruled the demurrer, holding the petitioners
alleged standing by claiming injury to the historic sites located on their
However, the court then dismissed the appeal with
property.
prejudice on the ground that Crutchfield failed to establish standing,
because she could not demonstrate any actual or imminent injury.
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded
the case for a hearing on the merits of the petition, holding
Crutchfield had standing to challenge the Board's issuance of the
permit. The Board and Hanover County appealed from the court of
appeals' judgment, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted
certiorari.
Before alleging that Crutchfield lacked standing, the Board
attempted to disqualify Crutchfield's appeal on procedural grounds.
The Virginia Supreme Court declined to adopt this view, holding the
trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in spite of Crutchfield's
failure to serve Hanover County as a necessary party at the time she
filed her petition for appeal. While the Board urged the court to view
this defect as fatal to the case, the court ruled Crutchfield's timely
filing of original petition and notice of appeal served to preserve
jurisdiction in the court of appeals, which had the discretion to grant
leave to amend.
The court next considered the Board's contention that the court
of appeals abused its discretion by granting Crutchfield leave to amend
the allegations of her original petition in defiance of a local rule

